



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION AND
COMBINED JOINT FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND - OIR
Baghdad, IRAQ
APO AE 09316

IRIZ-JA-OPL

26 February 2017

MEMORANDUM FOR CIVCAS Team, Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve, APO, AE 09306

SUBJECT: CIVCAS Credibility Assessment Report (CCAR) - Strike (b)(1)1.4a Dynamic Target of ISIS HME Cache, 24 (b)(1)1.4a February 2017 (CJFLCC-OIR 18/17)

1. BLUF. The CIVCAS allegation is NOT CREDIBLE. A thorough review of all available evidence does not provide enough evidence to conclude that it is more likely than not that a CIVCAS occurred as a consequence of Coalition Force airstrike.

2. CIVCAS Allegation.

a. Source. Twitter handle @IraqiSMCEn refers to unnamed press sources reporting "9 civilians were killed and more than 20 wounded in an aerial shelling which may be conducted by US-led coalition planes on Qa'im City."

b. Time and Location. Not specified in the social media report, but the report may correspond with engagements conducted by (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4a in the daytime morning hours of 24 Feb 2017 and by Coalition assets at (b)(1)1.4a z on 24 Feb 2017, in Husayba with aim points at the following grids: (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

c. Description. A former school now functioning as an ISIS VBIED Factory.

3. Strike Narrative and Analysis. The following is a chronological breakdown of the strike based on analysis of relevant mlRC logs, FMV footage, and post-strike assessments.

a. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4a aircraft conducted an airstrike on the target facility in the morning hours of 24 Feb 2017. Their strike reportedly had poor effects on the target.

b. CJTF J-34 passed the target through CJFLCC J-34 to the Baghdad Strike Cell to conduct a re-attack in order to deny the facility and its contents to ISIS.

c. Starting at 1023z, the ISR asset (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) was tasked to observe the target facility in preparation for (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) to strike the compound.

d. From 1023z to 1306z (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) observed men and some children filling bags around the target compound and putting the bags in pickup trucks. Some screeners assessed they were salvaging HME and some screeners assessed the bags were filled with dirt.

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e. At 1307z the Distributed Ground System screener asked whether the strike cell was aware of all of the children that were seen surrounding the facility.

f. At 1308, the CJTF ISR tactical controller comments that there were children in the compound prior to the first strike, which was conducted by (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4a. It is unclear at the CJFLCC level how this ISR tactical controller was aware of this activity.

g. At (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) gave a "green light" on collateral concerns with the target facility due to the fact that civilians in the vicinity of the target were clear of the collateral hazard area.

h. At (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) engaged the courtyard of the target compound in order to cause surrounding transients outside of the collateral hazard area to depart the vicinity and allow for larger ordinance to be used to destroy the target facility. One assessed ISIS fighter located near the east gate of the target compound may have been injured in this engagement, but there was not enough evidence to include him in the battle damage assessment. Civilians in the vicinity of the target were observed to depart the area following the strike and no CIVCAS was observed in this engagement.

i. At (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) called "no significant activity" due to the absence of any observed civilians in the immediate vicinity of the target and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) engaged the target compound again at (b)(1)1.4a.

j. The engagement at (b)(1)1.4a resulted in significant secondary explosions which cast debris and ejecta roughly one block east of the target compound, some of which landed close to a group of approximately five civilians standing on a street corner outside the expected blast ring. All of these individuals were observed to run away as the debris landed near them. No evidence of civilian deaths or serious injury to civilians was observed. There was no observed activity in the vicinity of the target after the strike that could be consistent with casualty care or mortuary affairs actions.

4. Credibility Assessment. Based on a thorough assessment of all reasonably available evidence, this CIVCAS allegation, insofar as it applies to strikes on the target conducted by Coalition Forces, is deemed NOT CREDIBLE. This assessment is based on the following:

a. While civilians were observed in the vicinity of the target before the strike, precautions were taken to ensure as far as practicable, that no civilians were within the collateral hazard area of the strike prior to engagement.

b. There is no evidence on the face of the strike records to indicate that any civilians were killed or injured as a consequence of the Coalition Forces strike.

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5. The point of contact for this CIVCAS Credibility Assessment Report is the undersigned at [redacted] (b)(3) 10 USC 130b; (b)(6)

//ORIGINAL SIGNED//

3 Encls

1. mIRC Chat Log
2. CJTF TARPACK
3. CDE Graphic
4. 3 strike videos are available on request

[redacted] (b)(3) 10 USC 130b; (b)(6)

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I have conducted a legal review of the information in this CCAR and the supporting evidence. Based upon all reasonably available information at this time, I find that:

(b)(5)

(c)(3) 10 USC 130b; (b)(6)

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I have reviewed the information contained in this CCAR and the supporting evidence. Based upon all reasonably available information at this time, I find that:

___ The evidence supports a finding of CREDIBLE. That is, it is more likely than not that the CIVCAS incident occurred. I direct an investigation be conducted by this command.

___ The evidence supports a finding of CREDIBLE. That is, it is more likely than not that the CIVCAS incident occurred. However, at this time I direct no investigation be conducted by this command, as no additional information could be discovered by further investigation.

9 ___ The evidence supports a finding of NOT CREDIBLE. Without additional evidence, I direct that no further action be taken by this command.


JOSEPH M. MARTIN
Major General, U.S. Army
Commanding

FEB 28 2017

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Pages 75 through 105 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibits removed per agreement - Bates 3028-3058

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