



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION AND
COMBINED JOINT FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND - OIR
UNION III, BAGHDAD, IRAQ
APO, AE 09348

IRIZ-JA

9 July 2017

MEMORANDUM FOR CIVCAS Team, Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve, Camp Arifjan, APO, AE 09306

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) CIVCAS Credibility Assessment Report (CCAR) – CAN Media Report, Strike on 25 February 2017 (CJFLCC-OIR 89/17)

1. (~~SECRET // REL TO FVEY~~) **BLUF**. This allegation is likely NOT CREDIBLE. A thorough review of all available strike records, together with information obtained from Iraqi Civil Defense, indicates that the alleged civilian casualty incident either did not occur or did not occur as a consequence of a Coalition strike.
2. (~~SECRET // REL TO FVEY~~) **CIVCAS Allegation**.
 - a. (~~SECRET // REL TO FVEY~~) *Source*. Reporter Derek Stoffel, CAN Media (CBC).
 - b. (~~SECRET // REL TO FVEY~~) *Time and Location*. 25 February 2017, Al Ma'mūn, West Mosul (GRG A.14, "Al Ma'mūn 1;" A.15, "Al Ma'mūn 2").
 - c. (~~SECRET // REL TO FVEY~~) *Description*. On 28 Mar 17, Derek Stoffel of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation reported that he had met with a man in Mosul earlier in March who informed him that 13 members of his family had been killed as a result of an airstrike on 25 Feb 17. In particular, he claimed that ISIS fighters had been "holed up in a school across from their home" before two fighters drove a car to the house next door to the family's house.
 - d. On 5 July 17, CDR, CJFLCC-OIR, MG Martin met with LtGen Abdul Amir, the Iraqi Ground Force Commander, to request for information from Iraqi Civil Defence that may help confirm the US Media Reporting. Information was received from MG Al-Shuwayli (Deputy National Operations Centre), BG Sulaiman (Director Ninawa Civil Defence), BG Muhummad (Operations Director Ninawa Civil Defence) and COL Rajb (Deputy Director for General) that this strike correlates with information obtained from Iraqi Civil Defence records. This information was that no civilians were killed at this site (b)(1)1.4a, that a vehicle was parked 'inside the house' which was targeted and destroyed.
3. (~~SECRET // REL TO FVEY~~) **Review**. CJFLCC-OIR OSJA reviewed all available records to determine whether any Coalition strikes, including air to surface and surface to surface fires, from 24-26 February 2017 could possibly correlate with the allegation, noting that the allegation does not attribute the attack specifically to Coalition Forces.

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One Coalition airstrike in Al Ma'mūn, West Mosul (GRG A.14, "Al Ma'mūn 1," A.15, "Al Ma'mūn 2") on 26 Feb 17 was identified as a potential match due to its location to the FLOT, and proximity to the Al Mosul School (approximately 100m away).

4. (~~SECRET // REL TO MESF~~) **Analysis.** The following is an overview of this Coalition airstrike, based on strike logs, FMV footage, mIRC chat logs, and post-strike assessments.

a. (~~SECRET // REL TO MESF~~) (b)(1)1.4a z // SHOOTER: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a // GRID: (b)(1)1.4a // ROE: (b)(1)1.4a BDA: VBIED DEST // AXIS: GHAZLANI // REQUESTER: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

b. (~~SECRET // REL TO FVEY~~) This engagement was a Coalition airstrike conducted in accordance with the collective self-defense provisions of the ROE. At the time, (b)(1)1.4d observed an up-armored vehicle (also assessed as a VBIED) drive into the Al Ma'mūn neighborhood within 350m of friendly forces. The VBIED parked in a courtyard between two residential structures (see enclosure 3). (b)(1)1.4d requested CJOC-E to engage the target.

c. (~~SECRET // REL TO FVEY~~) The CJOC-E TEA observed the target area with both (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) and determined with reasonable certainty that he had obtained positive identification of the target as a valid military objective. Observing no civilians within the area of the target, he approved the target for engagement. The target was weaponized with (b)(1)1.4a munition, in order to eliminate the target with minimal collateral effects on adjacent structures.

d. (~~SECRET // REL TO FVEY~~) As (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) positioned to engage the target, the TEA continued to monitor pre-strike scans which disclosed that there were no civilians present within the target area. The TEA authorized the JTAQ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) to clear (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) to engage the target at approximately (b)(1)1.4a. The munition impacted at (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a. At this time, a significant explosion occurred, causing structural failure to both of the surrounding buildings, which can be observed to 'pancake.' CJFLCC J34 assesses that a typical (b)(1)1.4a munition delivered in these circumstances would not cause complete structural collapse of the adjacent buildings, and that it is likely that secondary explosions caused by the detonation of the VBIED had this effect.

e. (~~SECRET // REL TO FVEY~~) Immediately after the engagement, however, (b)(1)1.4d assessed that the VBIED did not 'go high order' (i.e. explode) and was still operable underneath the rubble. (b)(1)1.4d requested reengagement of the target, which was approved by the TEA on the basis of the VBIEDs proximity to the FLOT, and likelihood that it would be recovered by ISIS to engage friendly forces. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) reengaged the target at approximately (b)(1)1.4a. No civilians were observed in the vicinity of the target pre-strike by the CJOC-E, however, due to either a mIRC interruption or lack of recording, there are no extant records of this strike. CJOC-E did

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not record this strike in their official logs and trackers, and no further information is available for this re-engagement.

5. (~~SECRET // REL TO FVEY~~) **Credibility Assessment.** On the basis of the details contained in the allegation and a thorough assessment of all reasonably available evidence, including the information provided by Iraqi Civil Defense, this civilian casualty allegation is deemed NOT CREDIBLE insofar as it relates to Coalition Forces. That is, it is more likely than not, based on all reasonably available evidence, that the alleged civilian casualty incident either did not occur or did not occur as a consequence of a Coalition strike.

6. (U//~~FOUO~~) The point of contact for this CIVCAS Credibility Assessment Report is the undersigned at (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6)

6 Encls

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6)

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I have conducted a legal review of the information in this CCAR and the supporting evidence. Based upon all reasonably available information at this time, I find that:

(b)(5)

(b)(3) 10 USC 130b; (b)(5)

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I have reviewed the information contained in this CCAR and the supporting evidence. Based upon all reasonably available information at this time, I find that:

___ The evidence supports a finding of CREDIBLE. That is, it is more likely than not that the CIVCAS incident occurred. I direct an investigation be conducted by this command.

___ The evidence supports a finding of CREDIBLE. That is, it is more likely than not that the CIVCAS incident occurred. However, at this time I direct no investigation be conducted by this command, as no additional information could be discovered by further investigation.

9 The evidence supports a finding of NOT CREDIBLE. Without additional evidence, I direct that no further action be taken by this command.


JOSEPH M. MARTIN
Major General, U.S. Army
Commanding General

Pages 5 through 24 redacted for the following reasons:

Exhibits removed per agreement - Bates Numbers 4288-4306

Approved for Release